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THREE MEANINGS OF MATERIALISM
I would like to lay the foundations forwhat can be called, fromSpinoza
onwards, a ‘materialist education’. Let me clarify from the outset three
different meanings of ‘materialism’ which we can use to understand a
‘materialist education’:
First, in the empirical or immediate sense, that is, in the sense that
a person, a behaviour, or an ideology is said to be materialistic when
what is valued is material goods.Therefore, ‘to bematerialistic’ is less a
label that is claimed than a label that is applied, often todepreciatewhat
is deemed to be materialistic. This definition of ‘materialistic’ implies
a way of living and thinking that values money, carnal pleasures, and
material comfort — in short, a way of life that is probably considered
too selfish or individualistic, and that would seem to detract from
higher values such as generosity or solidarity, or spiritual values that are
more concernedwith the salvation of souls thanwith the enjoyment of
bodies. I do not wish to discard this meaning of ‘materialism’, because
being materialistic has something to do with being a materialist, i.e.
* Author affiliation: Univ Paris Est Creteil, LIS, F-94010 Creteil, France
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a follower of materialism (especially since in some languages, such as
French, there is only one word: ‘matérialiste’).
Secondly, ‘materialism’ can be understood ontologically, that is, in
the sense of a reduction of reality tomatter alone: this ‘materialist’ con-
ception of theworld considers consciousness as a function of the body,
the mind as an emanation of the brain, and thought as a production
of matter. As Félix Ravaisson said, when attributing this definition to
Auguste Comte, materialism is the ‘doctrine that explains the superior
by the inferior’:1 of course, this is a definition proposed by a spiritualist
who devaluedmaterialist philosophies. But why should consciousness
be superior to the body or mind superior to the brain? Such an idea
presupposes a common measure between these two kinds of reality, a
presumption that Spinozism had already begun to challenge.
Thirdly and finally, it is possible to identify a ‘methodological’
materialism that does not itself pronounce on the nature of reality by
trying to answer questions such as whether there is a difference in
nature between thought andmatter or a possible reduction of thought
tomatter; instead, it studies psychic ormental phenomena in the same
way as it would study material or bodily phenomena, that is to say,
by taking them as the object of a causal, deterministic explanation,
or, as we say today, by ‘naturalizing’ them. In fact, methodological
materialism is based on the idea that the reality of thought or of the
psyche (ideas, affects) obeys natural necessity in the sameway that the
reality ofmatter or of the organism (themovements of the body) does.
So, from what point of view should a materialist education be
understood? I will immediately exclude the second meaning of onto-
logical materialism: Spinoza does not conceive of thought as some-
thing reducible tomatter. If we can derive amaterialist education from
his philosophy, it is not in the sense that it adopts such a position on
the nature of reality, and therefore on the nature of the first object of
education — the child. The child, just like any human being, has a
mind, comprised of a psychological or cognitive system, which follows
its own laws, and which cannot be reduced to bodily, physiological,
1 Félix Ravaisson, La Philosophie en France au xixe siècle (1867) (Paris: Vrin Reprise,
1983), p. 189: ‘Selon l’excellente définition d’Auguste Comte […], le matérialisme est
la doctrine qui explique le supérieur par l’inférieur’.
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and especially cerebral or neural laws. Educating a child is therefore
not just about impacting a brain.
Spinoza can be described as ‘materialist’ in the third sense that
we have identified, that is, in the methodological sense: this is a non-
reductionist materialism, which considers the mind a natural thing
that can be studied as bodies are studied. At the end of the preface to
the third part of Ethics, Spinoza explicitly declares that he intends to
studypsychicphenomenaas if theywere ‘lines, planes, andbodies’:2 he
intends to geometrize the psyche in the sameway that science geomet-
rizes an organism, and to use this method to study the properties and
causal lawsof bodies, in particular of humanbodies.The foundationsof
a physics of thought are laid on the samemodel as the physics ofmatter.
However, it should be noted in passing that thismethodologicalmater-
ialism is itself based on a certain ontological conception of reality: it is
because both thought andmatter are in fact the same reality conceived
under a different kind of being that it is methodologically necessary
to study psychic phenomena as we study material phenomena — or
to study material phenomena as we should study psychic phenomena,
that is, as phenomena of a single and unique Nature that is regulated
by precisely determined laws.3
From the point of view of education, this non-reductionist, meth-
odological materialism means two things:
First, that such education consists in impacting onboth the psyche
and the organism; education in this sense is a way of guiding human
behaviour, a way of directing human conduct, the purpose of which
is not to allow the child’s ‘free will’ to be exercised. Indeed, from
the point of view of a materialist, that is, deterministic education,
such free will does not exist; on the contrary, belief in free will is an
illusion which the moral system of judgment is based upon. In other
words, a materialist education does not have as its ultimate purpose
the conferral of self-responsibility, but rather self-knowledge; it is not
meant to teach obedience to moral rules but knowledge of procedural
2 Ethics iii, Praef.; CWS [The Collected Works of Spinoza, see abbreviations], i, p. 492.
3 See Ethics, iii, Praef.: ‘nature is always the same, and its virtue and power of acting are
everywhere one and the same, that is, the laws and rules of nature, according to which
all things happen, and change from one form to another, are always and everywhere
the same. So the way of understanding the nature of anything, of whatever kind, must
also be the same, namely, through the universal laws and rules of nature’ (ibid.).
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rules (knowledge of the procedures that regulate behaviour, self, and
other).
Secondly, another meaning of a non-reductionist, materialist edu-
cation is that themind is considered an automaton that is regulated in a
determined way, just as the body is regulated as a physical automaton.
This does not mean that consciousness does not matter: themindmay
be a ‘spiritual automaton’ determined by laws, but it still feels what
it is thinking.4 The child’s materialist education is not a behavioural
education, or rather, it is a behavioural education insofar as it involves
an education of consciousness, which is experience as it is lived in the
first person. The way a child experiences things does, of course, have
an effect on his behaviour, and this is why an education of behaviour
must be an education of the way things are lived, felt, and understood.
Nevertheless, the education that can be derived from Spinoza’s
thought is perhaps also a materialist education in the first sense that
we have given to this term: namely, the empirical meaning of a very
particular care given to the body and also, in a sense, to the enjoyment
of its power. Let me explain. We have seen that Spinoza’s materialism
is not a reductionist materialism, which would lose interest in psycho-
logical interiority and focus only on external behaviour. Nevertheless,
it must also be seen that, from a Spinozist point of view, themind is the
idea of a body existing in action: consciousness is consciousness of a
living, affected, and affecting body. The mind is all the more powerful
because it is the idea of a body that is itself more developed, more
active: ‘in proportion as a body is more capable than others of doing
many things at once, or being acted on in many ways at once, so its
mind is more capable than others of perceiving many at once’, says the
Scholium of proposition 12 of Ethics iii.
It is the strength of the capacity to affect or to be affected — what
Spinoza calls the ‘capacity of doing things or of being acted on’— that
makes up the cognitive strength of the mind: a highly sensitive body,
highly capable of being affected and of affecting, is a body whosemind
is capable of perceiving many things at once, and, by doing so, is also
4 See Treatise on Emendation of the Intellect (TdIE) 85; CWS i, p. 37: ‘This is the same
as what the ancients said, i.e., that true knowledge proceeds from cause to effect —
except that so far as I know they never conceived the soul (as we do here) as acting
according to certain laws, like a spiritual automaton’.
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capable of rationally understanding the relationships between things
(see the Scholium of Proposition 29 of Ethics ii).
MATERIALIST EDUCATION AND THE AFFECTIVE SENSIBILITY OF
THE BODY
Therefore, the challenge facing amaterialist education—an education
that, as we have seen, is education in knowledge rather than obedience
— is to develop the affective sensibility of the body in order to increase
the cognitive sensitivity of themind,whichmeans to increase its power
to act in thought, that is, its power to understand. However, to do this
it is necessary to change the body, to transform it even, in the sense
that education gives the body another form, another higher nature.
The originality of a Spinozist, materialist education lies in exactly this
transformation.
In one of the last Scholiums of the Ethics, we read:
In this life, then, we strive especially that the infant’s body may
change (as much as its nature allows and assists) into another,
capable of a greatmany things and related to amind verymuch
conscious of itself, of God, and of things.We strive, that is, that
whatever is related to its memory or imagination is of hardly
any moment in relation to the intellect.5
As François Zourabichvili noted in his masterly work on childhood,
the subject of the striving in question here is a ‘we’: conamur, we
strive.6 This is important because, as Spinoza explains several times,
the conatus is a striving to persevere in one’s being and not to change
into another: it therefore requires the action of another — the ‘we’ in
this case — so that the child’s body is changed into another. But who
is this ‘we’? It is, first and foremost, the collective striving of educators
of all kinds, parents, nurses, nannies, childcare workers, paediatricians,
teachers, etc. but it can also be the striving of institutions, starting with
schools, that contributes to the change in the child’s body. It is also
the striving of collective practices, care practices, sports education,
physical activities, and bodily awareness, all of which contribute to
5 Ethics v, 39 Schol.; CWS i, p. 614.
6 François Zourabichvili, Le Conservatisme paradoxal de Spinoza. Enfance et royauté
(Paris: PUF, 2002).
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increasing the abilities of the child’s body. This educational striving is
essential — we strive to it ‘apprime’, ‘first’, says the Scholium, and it is,
therefore, a major social striving, and it is (perhaps even more so in
Spinoza’s time than ours) a matter of life and death. Since death is a
threat to childhood, especially early childhood, we must help children
to quickly overcome this stage of fragility or physiological weakness;
we must help children to build another body, stronger, more resistant,
more ‘capable’.
At the same time, another important clarification is given in this
Scholium: the social body strives to change the body of childhood,
quantum ejus natura patitur eique conducit, or ‘as much as its nature
allows’ (patitur: as much as it is acted on), and as much as it assists
in it (ei conducit). This expression ‘quantum ejus natura patitur eique
conducit’ is decisive because it adroitly summarizes the terms in which
the problem of a materialist education of childhood are played out
— namely, the problem of the transformation of the child’s sensitive
body. This expression also includes a certain ambiguity, as it can be
interpreted as a restriction that prevents us from viewing the change
effected by education as a real transformation. In this interpretation,
the educationwould change the body asmuch as it preserves its nature,
or to put it another way, it would result in a change ‘in’ its nature and
not ‘of ’ its nature. This latter change is what Spinoza also refers to as a
‘death’. However, with reference to the Scholium of proposition 39 of
Ethics iv, we interpret this change not as a change that simply happens
‘to’ the body, but a change ‘of ’ its very nature and therefore as a real
transformation. Let us read the relevant Scholium:
[…] But here it should be noted that I understand the body
to die [mortem obire] when its parts are so disposed that they
acquire [obtineant] a different proportion of motion and rest
to one another. For I dare not deny that — even though the
circulation of the blood is maintained [retenta], as well as the
other [signs] on account of which the body is thought to be
alive — the human body can nevertheless be changed into an-
other nature entirely different from its own [in aliam naturam
a sua prorsus diversam mutari]. For no reason compels me to
maintain that the body does not die unless it is changed into a
corpse [mutetur in cadaver].
And, indeed, experience seems to urge a different conclu-
sion. Sometimes a man undergoes such changes [tales patiatur
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mutationes] that I should hardly have said he was the same
man. I have heard stories, for example, of a Spanish poet who
suffered an illness; though he recovered, he was left so oblivi-
ous to his past life that he did not believe the tales and tragedies
he had written were his own. He could surely have been taken
for a grown-up infant [pro infante adulto] if he had also forgot-
ten his native language.
If it seems incredible [incredibile videtur], what shall we
say of infants? A man of advanced years believes [credit] their
nature to be so different from its own [a sua tam diversam]
that he could not be persuaded that he was ever an infant, if he
did notmake this conjecture concerning himself from(NS: the
example of) others. But rather than provide the superstitious
with material for raising new questions, I prefer to leave this
discussion unfinished.7
Beyond the rhetorical precautions given in this Scholium, Spinoza also
puts forward a very interesting idea, which despite not being fully
founded in reason is stated with sufficient clarity to be identified:
namely, that death is not the same as becoming a corpse. Spinozism
thus leaves room to think of other forms of death than mere organic
death. To illustrate this idea of a non-organic death, Spinoza relies on
two examples: firstly, the Spanish poet’s amnesia, and secondly the
development of the baby, as if the passage from infantia to provecta
aetas, from infancy to adulthood, were a form of death.
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BODY
Spinoza certainly advances cautiously on this delicate subject and does
not claim that amnesia and adulthood are equivalent to the final death.
As so often occurs in Spinoza’s discourse, experience is summoned
to disturb a habitual conviction: in this example, he means to uproot
the identification between death and becoming a corpse. The first
experience concerns the amnesia of a certain Spanish poet, who has
become forgetful of his own literary creations and is no longer able to
recognize what should be most intimate to him or see himself in his
works — here amnesia is treated as a certain type of transformation
of the body, namely a body defined by its ability to remember. The
7 Ethics iv, 39 Schol.; CWS i, pp. 569–70.
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second experience concerns becoming an adult and is called upon to
reinforce this idea of a possible non-cadaveric transformation of the
body. Of course, Spinoza does not state in an affirmative way that the
baby’s body, which has become an adult body, is a body that has met
death (mortem obire), but he strongly suggests it, notably by using
the expression ‘naturam diversam’. In the first half of the Scholium,
death is defined as the transformation into a nature totally different
from one’s own (a sua prorsus diversam); it is then said, at the end of
Scholium, that theman of advanced age believes the nature of the baby
to be so different from his own (a sua tam diversam) that he needs the
mediation of others in order to persuade himself that he was a baby.
It shouldbepointedout, however, that this is only a ‘belief ’ (credit)
and that the adult may be mistaken. The rebuttal could be that the
man’s nature is not so different from that of the baby and that the baby
he was is not necessarily dead. But if we look at the structure of the
argumentation of this part of the Scholium,we note that the case of the
babywho has become an adult generalizes the case of the poet who has
become an amnesiac: Spinoza is telling us that if we consider the rather
exceptional case of the Spanish poet incredible (incredibile), then we
ought to take the far less exceptional, and therefore much more cred-
ible, case of the baby — here ’credit’ is the counterpart of ‘incredibile’,
and shows us that the case of the baby has a stronger experiential value
than that of the amnesiac poet. Here again, however, we are dealing
with a problem of self-recognition: the man of advanced years finds it
very difficult to recognize himself in a past which is, in a sense, his own,
andbecause he is also forgetful of this past, he needs others to persuade
him that he was once a baby. The man of advanced age is neither in
error nor in rational certainty when he ‘believes’ the nature of babies
very different from his own, nor is he in error or certainty when he
allows himself to be persuaded by others that he was once a baby. On
the one hand, he can see that there is a form of continuity from baby
to adult (in others, and therefore in himself), and that is why it is not
irrational for him to form the conjecture that he was once a baby —
but it is only a conjecture (de se conjecturam faceret). On the other
hand, he has great difficulty in believing in this continuity of nature,
and this difficulty is the indication that he feels that he is no longer
the same, that he has experienced an upheaval and that something of
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him has died. It may even be the case — but the text does not make
it possible to decide this — that what he feels within himself (the
absence of community with the baby) may have more truth than what
he convinces himself of via others (the continuity between the baby
and himself).
This example shows the ways in which Spinoza provides a defin-
ition of death that goes beyond the simple framework of becoming a
corpse. He suggests that life cannot be reduced to organic life alone
or to the mere preservation of physiological functions. We can call
this the life of the body, which is not strictly organic, affective life,
but also includes how life is constituted by the connection of images,
defined by the remembrance in and by the body, and by the body’s
ability to affect and be affected.The life of the organic body is certainly
necessary for the development of its affective life;moreover, there is no
affective life that is not inscribed in a life of organs, tissues, skin, and
physiological functions; however, if this life of the affective body is not
reducible to the life of the organic body, it is because, according to this
Scholium, the organic body can conserve itself while, at the same time,
the affective or sensitive body can be transformed. To put it another
way: the organic body can live while the affective body can die and
become another. This seems to be the case with the example of the
baby, which lives on as an organic body but ‘dies’ when it becomes
another affective body. It is important to insist on this becoming other
of the affective body because, as long as the organic body endures, the
death of the affective body is not a simple disappearance but rather the
advent of a new life of the affective body.
If the transformation is indeed what necessarily happens to the
body of childhood (infantile amnesia, which concerns the first three
or four years, and which occurs around the age of seven or eight, is one
of the signs of it), then a materialist education must take note of this
transformation, and accompany it as well as possible: it must aim at
making the transformation take place in such a way that the infant’s
body, or more generally speaking the child’s body, becomes a body
with very great sensory and sensitive aptitudes that are connected to
a very intelligent and consciously aware mind.8 If one wanted to say
8 See Ethics v, 39 Schol.; CWS i, p. 614: ‘And really, he who, like an infant or a child,
has a body capable of very few things, and very heavily dependent on external causes,
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things in a provocative way, one could say that materialist education
aims at a form of death for the child related to memory and affect and
not biology. This form of death induced by the materialist education
of the child’s body is a way of replacing it with another, stronger body.
However, it should be pointed out here that the aim is to transfer
thebodyof childhood from its first nature to another nature that is suit-
able for it, one that is really different from the first but not contrary to it.
The opposite transformation of the body into a different and contrary
naturewould be a brutal cadaveric transformation, for example the one
produced by suicide. In such a case, as Spinoza points out, the idea of
the new nature is not reproduced in the mind, and the transformation
amounts to a pure destruction of the one who is transformed.9 The
whole point of the transformation that accompanies education is to
give birth to a new nature which can be affirmed and desired by the
one who is educated. This new nature preserves traces of the previous
nature as not allmemory or all feeling is abolishedby it;10 it necessarily
has properties in commonwith the previous nature, and there is there-
fore a degree of continuity, which is why the child can contribute to
this transformation (‘as much as its nature allows and assists’). But he
can do so only under the educational impulse, only through collective
striving, since one thing, by itself, strives to persevere in its being, and
not to transform itself into another.
The expression ‘as much as its nature allows and assists’ indicates
both the dimension of passivity and the dimension of activity that are
specific to the child in changing their body. The nature of the child’s
body is acted on through such a change, in the sense that effects will
be produced in its corporeal nature that are only partially explicable
has a mind which considered solely in itself is conscious of almost nothing of itself, or
of God, or of things. On the other hand, he who has a body capable of a great many
things, has a mind which considered only in itself is very much conscious of itself, and
of God, and of things’.
9 SeeEthics iv, 20 Schol.;CWS i, p. 557: ‘Someonemay kill himself […]because hidden
external causes so dispose his imagination, and so affect his body, that it takes on
another nature, contrary to the former [aliam naturam priori contrariam], a nature of
which there cannot be an idea in the mind (by iiiP10). But that a man should, from
the necessity of his own nature, strive not to exist, or to be changed into another form,
is as impossible as that something should come from nothing’.
10 See Ethics iii, Post. 2; CWS i, p. 493: ‘The human body can undergo many changes
[multas pati potest mutationes], and nevertheless retain impressions, or traces, of the
objects (on this see ii Post. 5), and consequently, the same images of things’.
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through it, for although they can indeed be explained in large part by
the desires of the educators, by the (more or less conscious) striving
of the social body which determines (at least in part) the change in
the child’s body, Spinoza does not understand the child’s body as a
passive, receptive object. He also evokes its activity, or rather, to be
more rigorous, something like its activity (because ‘ei conducit’ is not
‘ad eum conducit’, a syntactic form that wouldmore completely suggest
the idea of full participation of the body in this transformation).We see
that the child’s body does not only undergo this fundamental change,
but rather, if the education is successful in terms of not being pure
compulsion effecting obedience, then the body in question directly
participates in its own transformation. With the expression ‘as much
as its nature allows and assists’ Spinoza suggests that the child stands
somehow in-between, that is, between passivity and activity, between
a joyful passivity that is not refractory to this useful change, and an
inchoate activity that participates in its own transformation, however
incompletely.Thismeans that in the ‘we’ of the conamur, in the collect-
ive nature of the educational striving, we can also hear the very striving
of the child as they gradually become their own educator.
FROM MORAL EDUCATION TO ETHICAL EDUCATION
Rather than being called ‘education’, it seems to me that material-
ist education should be characterized as ‘re-education’ or ‘counter-
education’. This is because usually education is geared towards obedi-
ence, and perhaps it is not even possible to escape thismoral education
when we are dealing with a relationship between beings who are dom-
inated by the imagination—certainly this is true of children, but it can
also be said for most adults. For their own sake, should children not
be taught to obey the rules set by parents?11 This moral or moralistic
education is even useful, since it teaches individuals to conform to the
11 See TTP xvi, 35; CWS ii, p. 289:‘even though children are bound to obey all the
commands of their parents, they are still not slaves. For their parents’ commands
are primarily concerned with the advantage of the children. We recognize a great
difference, then, between a slave, a son, and a subject. We define these as follows: a
slave is someonewho is bound to obey the commands of amaster, which are concerned
onlywith the advantage of the person issuing the command; a son is someonewhodoes
what is advantageous for himself, in accordancewith a parent’s command; and a subject,
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values of the group to which they belong, and teaches them the prin-
ciple that recognition from the group is offered to those who recognize
the group. It thus teaches them a form of autonomy which consists of
self-restraint and emotional self-control: in short, ordinary education
constitutes the child as a moral subject who is responsible for his or
her actions; it produces in him or her an ‘ingenium’ (a temperament)
of self-discipline so that, thanks to this emotional and reflexive in-
teriority, ‘it works on its own’. In this respect, we can say of moral
educationwhatMichel Foucault says of disciplinary power, the object-
ive ofwhich is not a discontinuous grasp on individuals but a perpetual
hold over them, which means that ‘one is perpetually in the situation
of being watched’— andwe could add, in the case of moral education,
‘watched by oneself ’. Thus, moral education, like disciplinary power,
‘looks to the future, to the moment when it will work on its own and
when surveillance may no longer be anything more than virtual, when
discipline, therefore, will have become a habit’.12
Spinozist materialist education consists of the work of self-
transformation, that is, the transformation of a self that is always first
educated for the purposes of obedience: such education is ‘counter-
education’ or ‘re-education’ in the sense of medical re-education,
which involves recovering a lost, damaged, or calcified capacity,
regaining flexibility, awakening frozen organs, reviving tetanized
muscles, undoing (in short) mechanisms which have become
hardened in order to produce connections that increase the power of
acting. To unbind and to bind again, forming new connection, disturbs
what is fixed or frozen and thus produces a liberating disconnection:
such is the task of a materialist education that can be deduced from
certain passages of the Ethics and which makes it possible to lay the
foundations of an education understood as an ethics rather than a
moral one.
finally, is someonewhodoeswhat is advantageous for the collective body—andhence,
also for himself — in accordance with the command of the supreme “power”’.
12 Michel Foucault, Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France 1973–1974, trans.
by Graham Burchell (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 47. In the original, ‘[le
pouvoir disciplinaire] regarde vers l’avenir, vers le moment où ça marchera tout seul
et où la surveillance pourra ne plus être que virtuelle, où la discipline, par conséquent,
sera devenue habitude’ (Michel Foucault, Le Pouvoir psychiatrique. Cours au Collège de
France. 1973–1974 (Paris: Gallimard Seuil, 2003), p. 49).
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The first text to be considered from the Ethics is one of the few
where education is explicitly mentioned.
[…] it is no wonder Sadness follows absolutely all those acts
which from custom are called wrong, and Joy, those which are
called right [omnes omnino actus, qui ex consuetudine pravi
vocantur, sequatur tristitia, et illos, qui recti dicuntur, lætitia].
For from what has been said above we easily understand that
this depends chiefly on education [nam hoc ab educatione
potissimum pendere]. Parents — by blaming the former acts,
and often scolding their children on account of them, and on
the other hand, by recommending and praising the latter acts
— have brought it about that emotions of Sadness were joined
to the one kind of act, and those of Joy to the other [parentes
nimirum, illos exprobanbo, liberosque propter eosdem sæpe
objurgando, hos contra suadendo, et laudando, effecerunt, ut
tristitiæ commotiones illis, lætitiæ vero his jungerentur].
Experience itself confirms this. For not everyone has the
same custom andReligion.On the contrary, what among some
is holy, among others is unholy; and what among some is
honourable, among others is dishonourable. Hence, according
as each one has been educated, so the either repents of a deed
or exults at being esteemed for it.13
What is ordinary education? It is about valuing some actions and
devaluing others. For educators, first and foremost parents, it is a
question of associating affects with certain acts (performed by chil-
dren) so that these acts are perceived — or better said, felt — as
positive or negative. Education, in terms of cognitive development
and the direction of conduct, is above all an undertaking that pro-
duces cognitive-affective connections in the child in order to solicit
or prevent certain behaviours: it consists in combining (jungere) the
representation of certain acts with emotions (commotions) of joy or
sadness.
How is this junction between representations and emotions
achieved? First, through an operation of nomination (vocantur,
dicuntur) that depends on customs (ex consuetudine): based on
traditional ways of speaking about the group to which they belong,
parents interpret certain acts and use terms charged with positive or
negative affects (‘wrong’, ‘right’, ‘good/bad’, ‘kind/bad’). At the same
13 Ethics iii, DA xxvii Exp.; CWS, i, p. 537.
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time, parents repeatedly formulate reproaches or encouragement by
blaming, reproving, and reprimanding (exprobrando, objurgando),
or congratulating, exhorting, and praising (suadendo, laudando). In
short, it is a question of the parent attaching (sequatur) an emotion
to the representation of the act the child has committed, which in
turn either increases or diminishes the child’s power to act. On the
basis of this production of an association between representation and
emotion more complex affects are then formed, which can be sorted
into the two types of love or hatred (love being a ‘joy accompanied by
the idea of an external cause’ and hate a ‘sadness accompanied by the
idea of an external cause’).14
The educational operation therefore shows that the very act per-
formed by the child, in itself, can be perfectly ‘innocent’: it only
becomes a moral act through the habit of appointment, and of valu-
ation or devaluation, which is performed by the parents.
Through this activity of cognitive-emotional conjunction, ordin-
ary education — which we would gladly call ‘moral education’ —
consists in producing in the child aspirations towards or repudiations
of certain acts, and not only concerning behaviours but also thoughts
or feelings. But whether or not these acts have an external expression,
or remain within the interiority of the child, the essential thing is that
they do not refer to ‘external causes’ but to ‘internal causes’ — that is,
to the ‘interiority’ of the child. This psychological interiority is even
constituted by the moralistic education of the child, which produces
in him what we can call ‘self-love’ or ‘self-loathing’, and which Spinoza
more readily calls ‘self-esteem’ or ‘repentance’, or ‘love of esteem’ and
‘shame’, these two affects being the socialized forms of satisfaction and
repentance.15 All education contributes to the activation of this law in
the child:
If someone has done something which he imagines affects
others with Joy, he will be affected with Joy accompanied by
the idea of himself as cause, or he will regard himself with
Joy. If, on the other hand, he has done something which he
imagines affects others with Sadness, he will regard himself
with Sadness.16
14 See Ethics iii, DA vi and vii; CWS i, p. 533.
15 See Ethics iii, 30 Schol.; CWS i, pp. 511–12, and iv, 52 Schol.; CWS i, p. 523.
16 Ethics iii, 30; CWS i, p. 510.
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Education therefore produces in the child a self-awareness which is
above all a moral awareness: by producing in the child affects of joy
and sadness ‘which are accompanied by the idea of an internal thing
as cause’,17 ordinary education makes for the child a cause, a moral
cause of affects that reward or sanction which is produced through the
judgment of others and the good or evil that has been done.Themoral
educator’s challenge is to produce cognitive-emotional sequences in
order for the child to form judgements about themself, to rejoice or
to feel sad about themself: the child learns to make value judgments
not first of all about things or other people but about themself and
their own actions — whether of the body, of language, thought, or of
desire. In order to behave well, they learn a kind of reflexivity which
is first of all an emotional reflexivity: they learn to glorify themself or
to repent. They are trained to train themselves, since there is no better
government of the other than a government of the affects by which the
other governs themselves
Such an education gives rise to an indefinite multiplicity of con-
crete educational practices, customary forms of moral education,
which are often based on religion. However, I would like to distin-
guish an education that the Theological-Political Treatise characterizes
as ‘good’18 and that from the Ethicswe could qualify, precisely, as ‘eth-
ical’ from these other forms of moral, social, and religious education.
Its most significant quality is that it does not submit to a power as
soon as it becomes tyrannical.19 Therefore, good education is char-
acterized by a political virtue, namely resistance to abuse of power;
and this resistance itself is characterized by two remarkable properties:
its form (speaking out) and its radicality (resistance to the peril of
one’s life). According toChapter xxof theTheological-Political Treatise,
these two characteristics have emotional prerequisites: in a negative
way, they imply not being carried away by certain affects, those that
lead to submission (greed or sycophancy), but also and especially
the fear of death; and, in a positive way, possessing and cultivating a
‘moral force’ and a love of freedom, above all the ‘freedom to speak’.
17 See Ethics iii, DA xxiv Exp.; CWS i, p. 536.
18 TTP vii [90]; CWS ii, p. 206, and xx [28]; CWS ii, p. 349: ‘good education [bona
educatio]’.
19 SeeTTP xx (the end).
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However, the production of such affects, which run counter to the
affects of subjection, requires the defeat of ordinary loves and hatreds
and the development of new sequences of affections — those which
proposition 10 of Ethics v tells us are made ‘according to an order for
the intellect’. Good education is above all an education in reason: an
education in the affected reason, which is at the same time an educa-
tion in rational affectivity.
Who is such an education for? For children, undoubtedly, since a
good education doubles ordinary education and develops in the child
(alongside moral affectivity and self-discipline) a desire for rational-
ity and freedom: if such an education does not produce rationality
in them, it at least can cultivate the beginnings of adequate thought,
which is above all thought aimed at continuous reform. This makes
possible, if only at a later time, a re-education of passionate self-
satisfaction.This good, rational education is also aimed at adults if they
are eager for a new, firmer, and more serene existence. For Spinoza
places this task of re-education is very high on the agenda.20
While Spinoza did not write the ‘science of education’ mentioned
in the prologue to the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, he at
least showed in theEthics a real concern for education, somuch so that
one might wonder whether this treatise on the science of education
would not have ended up resembling theEthics or have been somehow
a derivative of it. And in more general terms, we should understand
Spinoza’s ethics as a practical philosophy that consists of a materialist
education — of children and of oneself — aimed at transforming the
affective sensibility of body and mind.
20 See Ethics iv, App. ix;CSW i, 589: ‘because, among singular things, we know nothing
more excellent than a man who is guided by reason, we can show best how much our
skill and understanding are worth by educating men so that at last they live according
to the command of their own reason’.
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